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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
ROMEO LUCERO OLIVAREZ, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20150284-CA 
Appellant is incarcerated. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Olivarez's opening brief argues that the trial court erred when it failed to 
suppress evidence obtained from an unreasonable stop and an unjustified impound of the 
vehicle Mr. Olivarez was driving. Specifically, Officer Crowther lacked reasonable, 
articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing for the traffic stop when Mr. Olivarez 
complied with Utah's lane change law by signaling for two seconds before instigating his 
lane change movement involving multiple lanes. And, because this law is unambiguous, 
Officer Crowther did not make a reasonable mistake of law in interpreting the lane 
change statute to require a driver to signal and remain in each lane for two seconds when 
doing a lane change involving several lanes. In addition, the vehicle impound was 
unjustified where it was tainted by the improper stop, where it was not authorized by state 
statute, where there was no legitimate community-care taking purpose to impound the 
vehicle, and where Officer Crowther failed to follow standardized impoundment 
procedures. 
In response, the State contends that the stop of defendant was justified because 
Officer Crowther's interpretation of Utah's lane change law was correct, and if it was not, 
that he made a reasonable mistake of law in interpreting the lane change law to justify the 
stop. The State also contends that the totality of the circumstances justified the 
impoundment of the vehicle. For the reasons set forth in the opening brief and in this 
reply brief, the State is incorrect. See Utah R. App. P. 24 (c) ("Reply briefs shall be 
limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief."). 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in not suppressing the illegally obtained fruits 
acquired from an improper stop and unjustified impoundment of the 
vehicle Mr. Olivarez was driving. 
Mr. Olivarez's opening brief argues that the trial court should have suppressed the 
fruits of an unreasonable stop because: 1) Mr. Olivarez's lane change maneuver complied 
with Utah's lane change statute so Officer Crowther lacked reasonable, articulable 
suspicion to stop him, and 2) Officer Crowther did not make a reasonable mistake of law 
in interpreting the unambiguous statute to justify the stop. See Appellant's Br. 11-21. In 
addition, Mr. Olivarez's opening brief argues that the impoundment of the vehicle that 
Mr. Olivarez was driving was unjustified for numerous reasons, including that it was 
tainted by the unlawful stop, it was not justified by statute, it had no legitimate 
community-caretaking purpose, and it did not comply with standardized police 
procedures. See Appellant's Br. 22-36. In response, the State contends that both the stop 
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and impoundment of the vehicle was justified. See Appellee's Br. 9-25. The State is 
mistaken for the following reasons. 
A. Mr. Olivarez complied with the requirements of Utah's unambiguous lane 
change statute. 
The plain language of Utah's lane change statute shows that Officer Crowther 
lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Olivarez was engaging in criminal 
behavior when he made a traffic stop for a lane change maneuver where Mr. Olivarez 
initiated his signal for two seconds before travelling across two lanes of traffic "in one 
continuous movement" until he reached the far right lane. 1 R. 65-66, 142, 153. See also 
Utah Code §41-6a-804(1); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968). Utah's lane change 
statute says: 
(a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left on a roadway or change 
lanes until: 
(i) the movement can be made with reasonable safety; and 
(ii) an appropriate signal has been given as provided under this section. 
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to change lanes shall be given 
continuously for at least the last two seconds preceding the beginning of the 
movement. 
Utah Code §41-6a-804(1) (emphasis added). 
While the statute is addressing the requirements for both turns and lane changes, it 
is also clear that regarding lane changes, the statute refers to lanes in the plural, and not 
lane in the singular. Utah Code §41-6a-804(1). Thus, a plain language interpretation of 
the statute says that a person needing to "change lanes" (i.e. multiple lanes) must: 1) do 
1 The State and Officer Crowther never contested that Mr. Olivarez met the two second 
signaling requirement of the lane change statute when he initiated his signal before 
driving from lane two to lane three. R. 65-66, 141-42; See also Appellee's Br. 13. 
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so with "a movement [that] can be made with reasonable safety; and'', 2) initiate a signal 
for two seconds ''preceding the beginning of the movement[,]" which may involve one or 
more "lanes." Utah Code §41-6a-804(1) ( emphasis added). Furthermore, the statute 
unambiguously states that the signal requirement applies to the two seconds 
''preceding[,]" or before, the vehicle begins changing lanes, (i.e. "a movement") and not 
during or after the lane change movement is underway. Id.; see also Lorenzo v. 
Workforce Appeals Bd., 2002 UT App 371, ,r 11, 58 P.3d 873 ("The plain language 
controls the interpretation of a statute, and only if there is ambiguity do we look beyond 
the plain language") (internal quotations omitted). 
The State and Officer Crowther's reading of the statute is therefore incorrect in 
interpreting the statute to say that a driver must instigate a two second signal prior to each 
individual lane change, and to remain in each lane for two seconds, while signaling, when 
changing several lanes. R. 65-66, 142, 153; see also Appellee's Br. 11-14. This incorrect 
interpretation requires reading in additional words to the statute that are simply not there. 
The State is also mistaken in arguing that the statute requires that an individual stay and 
signal for two seconds in each lane in order to meet the "reasonable safety" requirements 
of the statue. See Appellee's Br. 14-15. An examination of Utah Code §41-6a-804(l)(a) 
(i), which outlines the safety requirement, shows that there is nothing in this section to 
indicate how many seconds a vehicle must remain in each lane to be safe. Nor should it. 
That is, the time required to change lanes in a reasonably safe manner is variable and 
depends upon traffic, road hazards, vehicle speed, and a plethora of other conditions that 
might exist for the driver at that moment. The State's reading of the statute therefore 
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incorrectly conflates the statutory requirement that a driver be required to signal for two 
seconds prior to changing lanes with a requirement that a driver stay in each lane for two 
seconds when changing lanes to be safe, thus incorrectly merging the requirements of 
subsection (l)(a)(i) and (l)(b) of the statute in a way that should not be merged. See Utah 
Code §41-6a-804(l)(a) and (b); see also Appellee's Br. 14-15. And, contrary to the 
State's view, it is more consistent with the purpose of the statute (i.e. to effectuate safe 
lane changes) to read the statute as not dictating the number of seconds that a vehicle is 
required to remain in each lane in order to be safe because of the variety of road 
conditions that a driver could face when needing to change lanes. 
The State is also incorrect in arguing that if Officer Crowther's interpretation of 
the statute was wrong, then he made a reasonable mistake of law that justified the stop. 
See Heien v. N. Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 532 (2014). A police officer makes an 
objectively reasonable mistake of law only when the law at issue is ambiguous, and 
Utah's lane change statute is not ambiguous. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539; see also Bonham v. 
Morgan, 788 P .2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) ("Unambiguous language in the statute may not 
be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning."). That is, the plain language of the statute 
talks about when a signaling requirement must be met (i.e. ''preceding the beginning of 
the movement"). Utah Code §41-6a-804(l)(b) (emphasis added). The statute also 
unambiguously indicates that a "movement" is either a "tum" or an instance of when a 
vehicle must "change lanes" (i.e. one or more lanes). Utah Code §41-6a-804(l)(a). Thus, 
because Utah's lane change statute is not ambiguous, and Mr. Olivarez fully complied 
with the statute by initiating his signal for two seconds prior to making a lane change 
5 
movement involving multiple lanes, Officer Crowther lacked reasonable, articulable 
suspicion to stop his vehicle and the trial court erred in not suppressing the evidence 
obtained from the unconstitutional stop of Mr. Olivarez. R. 65-66, 142, 153. 
B. The impoundment of the vehicle Mr. Olivarez was driving was unjustified for 
numerous reasons. 
A warrantless vehicle impound is justified by the Fourth Amendment by either 
"explicit statutory authorization or by the circumstances surrounding the initial stop." 
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264,268 (Utah 1985). The impoundment of Mr. Olivarez's 
vehicle was not authorized by Utah's vehicle impound statute, and the State concedes 
this. See Utah Code §41-la-1101; see also Appellee's Br. 19. The question, then, is 
whether the circumstances surrounding the stop of Mr. Olivarez justified the 
impoundment. In other words, would a reasonable officer have impounded the vehicle? 
See State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Mr. Olivarez's opening 
brief argues that the totality of circumstances shows that the impoundment violated the 
Fourth Amendment because it was tainted by the unlawful stop, had no legitimate 
community-caretaking purpose, and did not comply with the standardized police 
procedures that Officer Crowther was required to follow. See Appellant's Br. 22-36. The 
State and trial court are therefore mistaken that the impoundment was justified because 
Mr. Olivarez did not have a valid driver's license, was not the owner of the vehicle, and 
was the only occupant of the vehicle as these factors do not sufficiently address all of the 
circumstances that must be examined in assessing whether the impoundment was 
justified. See United States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 2015) R. 67; 
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see also Appellee's Br. 18-20. Furthermore, a more detailed and accurate examination of 
the circumstances shows that the impoundment in this case was not justified. 
First, the impoundment of Mr. Olivarez's vehicle lacked a legitimate community-
caretaking purpose. See Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1250-51 (providing a list of factors to 
consider when determining whether an impoundment meets an objective standard of a 
legitimate community-caretaking purpose); see also State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 
502-503 (Minn. 2008); see also Appellant's Br. 26-27. That is, the vehicle Mr. Olivarez 
was driving was not unlawfully parked nor causing a traffic hazard, the vehicle was not 
implicated in a crime, the vehicle's owner and Mr. Olivarez did not consent to the 
impound, and an alternative to impoundment existed because Mr. Olivarez asked to call 
his brother, the registered owner of the vehicle, in order for him to quickly take the car. 
R. 147-53, 163; see also Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1250; see also Appellant's Br. 29-32. The 
alternative to impound that existed in this case shows that the State is mistaken in arguing 
that Officer Crowther had only two choices-- to leave the car there or to impound it. 
Appellee's Br. 18-20. That is, the ability of Mr. Olivarez's brother to quickly retrieve the 
car was apparent, as before it was towed, he arrived to retrieve the vehicle. R. 149-153, 
163. 
The State is also mistaken in arguing that the Fourth Amendment did not require 
Officer Crowther to determine whether any alternatives to impound existed. See 
Appellee's Br. 21. That is, established case law shows that an officer must allow for 
alternative arrangements once a viable and immediate option is requested and presented, 
otherwise, the impoundment is unconstitutional. See Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1250; Gauster, 
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752 N.W.2d at 507-08; Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268; see also Appellant's Br. 30. Here, a viable 
and immediate alternative option existed as before Mr. Olivarez was arrested, he asked to 
call his brother to come take quick possession of the vehicle. R. 147-153, 163; see also 
Gauster, 752 N. W.2d at 506-08; Thus, the impoundment of the vehicle was neither 
reasonable nor necessary because the totality of the circumstances shows that a legitimate 
community-caretaking purpose did not exist. Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1250-51. 
Second, the impoundment failed to comply with the Salt Lake City Police 
Department's standardized procedures. R. 150-51; see also Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1243 
(stating that impoundments are constitutional only when they are "guided by both 
standardized criteria and a legitimate community caretaking rationale.") (emphasis 
added). In Colorado v. Bertine, the United States Supreme Court held that police 
discretion for an impound may exist "so long as that discretion is exercised according to 
standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of 
criminal activity." 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987) (emphasis added). Thus, "the Bertine 
decision establishes that ... warrantless impoundments are unconstitutional [ when they] 
are not exercised according to standardized criteria" that limits an officer's discretion of 
when to impound a vehicle. Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1245. Standardized police procedures 
are necessary because they prevent discriminatory police impounds. See id. And, because 
"Bertine makes the existence of standardized criteria the touchstone of the inquiry into 
whether an impoundment is lawful[,]" Sanders, 796 F .3d at 1248-49, the State is 
mistaken in arguing that this Court should follow the rationale of First, Third, and Fifth 
Circuit's cases that hold that courts need not look at whether an impoundment follows 
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standardized protocols to be justified under the Fourth Amendment. See Sanders, 796 
F.3d at 1248; see also Appellee's Br. 23- 24. Rather, this Court should follow the 
rationale of the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits that hold that the 
legality of a vehicle impound does depend on whether a police officer complied with 
their localized, standardized impound procedures. See Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1248; see 
also id. at 1259 (stating that "to hold, as have the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits, that 
standardized criteria are never relevant is to ignore the plain language of Bertine."). 
Here, Officer Crowther failed to follow Salt Lake City Police Department's 
standardized procedures ("Impound Policies") as these procedures restricted rather than 
expanded the discretion he could use when deciding whether to impound the vehicle Mr. 
Olivarez was driving. See Appellant's Br. 33-34. Specifically, the Impound Policies 
made clear that Officer Crowther needed to use his discretion in favor of preventing 
needless financial burdens and inconveniences to the vehicle's owner, which Officer 
Crowther did not do. R. 150-51. In addition, a review of the Impound Policies regarding 
the scenarios where impoundment is prohibited or discouraged reveal that Officer 
Crowther should not have impounded the vehicle because Mr. Olivarez was driving on a 
denied driver's license. R. 147, 148. See Appellant's Br. 33-34 (pointing out that the 
Impound Policies discourage and prohibit impoundments for scenarios involving no 
insurance, expired vehicle registration, and a driver's arrest for traffic violations, which 
are all similar in kind to driving on a denied driver's license). Thus, because the Impound 
Policies substantially limit an officer's discretion so that impoundment should only occur 
where absolutely necessary, and the impoundment in this matter was not necessary, the 
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State is incorrect in arguing that Officer Crowther complied with the standardized police 
policies he was required to follow. See Appellee's Br. 25. 
Ultimately, the impoundment of the vehicle in this case was unconstitutional 
because the totality of circumstances shows that the impoundment was tainted by the 
unlawful stop, not prescribed by statute, had no legitimate community-caretaking 
purpose, and did not comply with the standardized police procedures. See Appellant's Br. 
22-37. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given above and in the opening brief, Mr. Olivarez respectfully 
asks this Court to reverse the district court's ruling that the stop and impound of his 
vehicle was legally justified in this matter. 
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SUBMITTED this ____ day of May, 2016. 
Attorney for Def end ant/ Appellant 
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